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From the early nineties onwards, the Spanish labour market has exhibited two salient features in
cross-country comparisons: (F1) a highly segmented Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
leading to a widespread use of temporary (xed-term) contracts, and (F2) a large slowdown in
the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). As regards F1, it goes back to the approval
in 1984 of a \two-tier" reform in Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) aiming to ght a
very high unemployment rate in the early 1980s (around 18%). This reform allowed for much
higher exibility in the use of temporary contracts (entailing very low severance pay) which could
be used for any type of jobs (not just for replacement or or seasonal activities), while the strict
EPL regulation for regular open-ended/permanent contracts (entailing high severance pay) was
left unchanged.1 As a result, the share of temporary workers in total salaried employment surged
from 10% in the mid-1980s to 35.4% in the mid-1990s, with more than 90% of new hires per year
being signed under these exible contracts. Later on, this proportion reached a plateau of 30%,
about twice the European average, despite several additional countervailing reforms. Even during
the recent (great) recession, where a massive destruction of temporary jobs in the real state and
services sectors has taken place (see Bentolila et al., 2010), the rate of temporary workers has only
dropped to 26% which still remains one of the highest in the OECD.
With regard to F2, labour productivity experienced a signicant slowdown during the 1990s, with
average annual growth rate of GDP per hour worked falling from 2.9% in 1970-1994 to 0.3% in
1995-2005. Over the latter period, up to the onset of the current global crisis, both employment
and hours worked surged (average annual growth rates of 3.5% and 3.1%, respectively). Yet, the
fall in productivity growth has not been the outcome of lower capital accumulation per worker
in the aftermath of rapid employment growth but rather it has been the outcome of a drastic
reduction in TFP growth, from 1.5% in 1980-1994 to -0.5% in 1995-2005. Although a relevant part
of this slowdown in TFP growth has been due to the strong dependence of the Spanish economy on
several low value-added industries (like residential construction, tourism and personal services),
there is ample evidence documenting that it has also aected tradable sectors, like manufacturing
(see Escrib a and Murgui, 2009). This dismal performance, over a period where the use of new
ICT technologies was very intense worldwide, contrasts sharply not only with the US experience
-where productivity sharply accelerated since the nineties- but also with the rest of the EU-15,
where the productivity slowdown has been less acute (labour productivity and TFP fell from 2.7%
and 0.7% in 1970-1994 to 1.3% and 0.3% in 1995-2005, respectively) than in Spain.2
1In contrast with regular open-ended contracts, the 1984 reform meant that temporary contracts entailed no
severance payments and their termination could not be appealed to labour courts (for details, see Dolado et al.,
2002 and 2008).
2The data source is EUKLEMS, a harmonized data set for multifactor productivity in EU countries (see Escrib a
2Given that work practices are fundamental determinants of rms' productivity (see Schmitz,
2005), our goal in this paper is to analyze whether a link can be established between persistent
duality/segmentation in the labour market and the TFP slowdown. In particular, we focus on
evaluating the impact of having large dierences between EPL for permanent and temporary
workers (the ring-cost gap, hereafter) on TFP development in Spanish manufacturing rms. The
mechanism we explore is one whereby a change in the ring-cost gap can aect rms' decisions
on contract upgrading which, in turn, aects temporary workers' decisions on how much eort is
exerted and how much paid-for training they receive from employers. To the extent that eort
and training are important components of TFP, both of these channels can play a signicant role
in relating dual EPL and TPF.
In order to provide a causal interpretation of this relationship, we start by proposing a streamlined
model of how rms' and workers' decisions interact in a prototypical dual labor market. Regarding
rms, it is assumed that they always use a probation temporary contract for their initial hirings
of workers.3 Specically, this is a non-renewable xed-term contract, lasting for one period, after
which the worker can be dismissed with low or even without termination costs. Accordingly,
once this contract expires, employers must decide whether to dismiss or maintain the worker.
Legal regulations imply that, if the worker remains in the job, the temporary contract should be
upgraded to a open-ended (permanent) contract subject to much higher severance pay. As for
workers, we simplify the model by assuming that they only choose the level of job eort when they
work under a temporary contract. They do so by maximizing their expected discounted utility
which is increasing in the probability of getting promoted to a preferable long-lasting job. By
contrast, it is assumed that strict EPL for permanent contracts does not aect the level of eort
exerted by those workers who accede to these jobs. The implicit assumption is that protection of
this kind, by reducing hold-ups and opportunistic behaviour by employers and employees, implies
that the latter do not shirk and provide the required level of eort to make these jobs protable.
Hence, while temporary workers supply eort by trading o the disutility of working against a
higher probability of getting promoted, rms with this type of jobs design contracts and choose
conversion rates from temporary to permanent contracts (temp-to-perm conversion rate in short)
to elicit that level of workers' eort that maximizes their expected prots, subject to workers'
participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Moreover, we also extend this setup by
considering rms' decisions to provide paid-for training to temporary workers as an additional
way of increasing their productivity if they were to remain in the rm. Our main nding is that,
insofar as eort and training are costly and severance pay is not neutral,4 a higher ring-cost
and Murgui, 2009).
3We simplify the analysis by abstracting from direct hirings by rms of workers under permanent contracts since
these only have represented around 10% of all annual hirings during the sample period (see Dolado et al., 2008)
4That is, it is not perfectly transferable between employers and workers, as in Lazear (1990).
3gap will reduce temp-to-perm conversion rates, eort and paid-for training. The basic insight is
that an increase (decrease) in this gap reduces (increases) rm's propensity to promote temporary
workers or even to train them which, in turn, induces temporary workers to exert lower (higher)
eort.
To test this implication, we use longitudinal rm-level data from the Survey on Business Strate-
gies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE) which provides detailed information on a
representative sample of Spanish manufacturing rms from 1991 to 2005. In particular, a valuable
feature of this data set is that it includes information on the dierent types of labour contracts
held by workers in each rm. This allows us both to retrieve temp-to-perm conversion rates and
TFP at the rm level in each year of the sample. .
Some preliminary motivation for our empirical approach is provided by Figure 1, where the (em-
ployment weighted) annual averages of the temp-to-perm conversion rates (left axis) and TFP
growth rates (right axis) are jointly displayed for our sample of manufacturing rms.5 As can be
observed, both variables move quite closely over time. Specically, not only they share a common
declining time trend from the early 2000s, when an EPL reform ended up increasing EPL for
permanent jobs, but also experience noticeable increases in 1995-1996 and 1998-1999, just after
another two earlier reforms which succeeded in reducing the ring-costs gap. In view of this
evidence, it is worth exploring by how much changes in dual EPL regulation are able to explain
these similar time patterns in the two above-mentioned rates.
[ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
To do so, lacking direct measures of workers' eort or paid-for training in our data set, our strat-
egy is to assume a monotonic increasing relationship between those two variables and rms' TFP.
Under this plausible assumption, we evaluate the impact of changes in the ring-cost gap on
rms' TFP using as natural experiments several labour market reforms entailing changes in EPL
during the available sample period (1994, 1997 and 2002) Since these reforms are nationwide, we
obtain variation across rms in the "treatment" by assuming that, controlling for size and other
observable characteristics, rms with higher shares of temporary workers before the reforms are
bound to be more strongly aected by their subsequent implementation. Our main empirical
nding is that rms which beneted the most from these reforms, because they had more can-
didates for promotion, exhibited higher conversion rates and, as a result, were signicantly more
productive than those rms which beneted the least. Hence, we interpret this result as yielding
some favourable support to the main prediction of the model.6
5As will be explained in Section 3, TFP has been computed using Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) estimation
approach of production functions since the computation of standard Solow-Hall residuals would invalidate our
identifying strategy of the relationship between both variables.
6Another plausible interpretation of this eect, which is explored in our model, could be that rms invest less in
4In regards to how this paper ts in the available research on the impact of reforms of EPL on the
labour market, our main contribution lies in analyzing how a large ring-cost gap may aect TFP
rather than employment and unemployment, which has been the main focus in most of the related
literature on dual labour markets.7 There are, however, some papers that have previously dealt
with the eects of EPL on labour productivity, but from a dierent angle than ours. For example,
Autor et al. (2007), Bassanini et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence showing that strict EPL
has a depressing impact on productivity because it reduces the level of risk that rms are ready to
endure in experimenting with new technologies or because there is less threat of layo in response
to poor work performance (see also Ichino and Riphan, 2005). Yet these studies do not analyze a
dual EPL system, as we do, but rather focus on the eects of the overall level of EPL. Further, our
focus also diers from that strand of this literature which considers dual EPL.. For example, Boeri
and Garibaldi (2007) analyze the Italian two-tier labour market and nd a negative relationship
between the share of temporary workers and rms' labour productivity growth in Italy. They
interpret this nding in terms of a transitory increase in labour demand induced by the higher
exibility of temporary jobs (i.e., the so-called \honeymoon" eect of this type of reforms) which,
by, assuming decreasing marginal returns to labour, leads rms to increasingly hire less productive
workers through these contracts. Likewise, estimating the reduced form of a standard eciency-
wage model for the same database we use here, albeit for a much shorter period (1991-1994),
S anchez and Toharia (2000) nd a negative relationship between the share of temporary work
and labour productivity in Spanish manufacturing rms. Similarly, more updated results for this
country have been obtained by Alonso-Borrego (2010) using the Firms' Balance Sheets of the
Bank of Spain. Yet, none of these papers explore the key mechanism linking changes in ring-
costs gap to conversion rates and eort that we stress here. Finally, the closest paper to ours is
Engellhandt and Riphan (2005), who nd evidence that Swiss temporary workers exert a higher
eort than permanent workers, using the willingness to undertake unpaid overtime work as a
proxy for exerting eort. Yet, as will be discussed further below, the seemingly opposite results
to ours that they report can be rationalized within our analytical framework. The insight is that,
being the EPL gap and the share of temporary workers (12%) in Switzerland much lower than in
Spain, Swiss temporary workers expect much larger conversion rates and therefore exert higher
eort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a simple model of the determinants
providing paid-for- training to temporary workers given their high turnover rate when the ring -costs gap is high.
This result has been found elsewhere in the literature (see Alba-Ram rez, 1994 and de la Rica et al., 2008) using
alternative data sets that do not allow to obtain TFP estimates at the rm level. Yet, we cannot evaluate this eect
since ESEE does not contain information on training.
7See, inter alia, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Dolado et al. (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Bentolila
et al. (2010).
5of temporary workers' eort, rms' temp-to-perm conversion rates and paid-for training that
provides relevant predictions for the subsequent empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data set
and presents descriptive statistics on rms' TFP, the share of temporary workers and the contract
conversion rates, together with a preliminary nonparametric analysis of how the distribution of
TFP diers across rms depending on their conversion rates. Section 4 presents further evidence
based on panel regression about the eect of changes in the ring costs gap, via conversion rates,
on rms' TFP and discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. An Appendix
contains detailed denitions of the variables.
2 A simple analytical framework of a two-tier labour market
It is assumed that labour-market regulations imply that the initial contract oered by rms to
any job seeker is always a non-renewable xed-term contract (T) which only lasts for one period.
At its termination, the rm has to decide whether to renew the worker with a permanent contract
(P) or to close the job. Workers under temporary contracts choose a level of work eort, e,
and receive a wage, wT, set by the rm. For convenience, we follow most of the literature on
eciency-wage models in assuming that workers' instantaneous utility is linear, i.e., U(wT;e) =
wT   e, where eort is taken to be bounded and normalized such that e 2 [0;1]. Permanent
contracts dier from temporary ones not only in length (they are open ended) but also in ring
costs (they entail severance pay F whereas, for simplicity, temporary contracts are assumed to
entail none). Hence, F can be directly interpreted as the ring- cost gap. A temporary contract
is converted into a permanent one with an (endogenous) probability p(e)R. This signies that
the conversion probability is the product of: (i) the probability rate at which the worker becomes
eligible for conversion at each level of eort, p(e), which satises p(0) = 0, p(1) = 1 and p0(e) > 0;
p00(e) < 0, and (ii) the conversion rate, R; chosen by rms among the set of eligible workers. The
insight is that, if the worker chooses to exert no eort (e = 0) she/he will have no chances of
conversion whatsoever while, even if the worker exerts maximal eort (e = 1), the probability of
being upgraded to a permanent contract may not be unity due to the presence of other costly
regulations (i.e., the ring-cost gap in our case) faced by rms in deciding whether to promote
workers.
As will become clear below, our model of eort and conversion boils down to a simple problem
of incentives, whereby the rm's and the worker's respective choices of the conversion rate, R,
and eort, e., become interrelated. It is noteworthy that, in order to highlight this issue in the
subsequent analysis, we abstract from the use of temporary contracts by rms as a screening device
for workers' unobservable skills under asymmetric information, ignoring therefore the signaling
6role of workers' eort.8 Also, since our focus lies on rank-and-le workers, instead of professionals,
we also abstract from other arguments used in the theory of labour market tournaments (see, e.g.,
Lazear and Rosen, 1981) whereby temporary workers could be thought of as competing for a given
number of open-ended positions. In such a setup, a low value of R could achieve higher workers'
eort through competition. Yet, the alternative interpretation we stress here is that it is solely
the worker's eort (plus the EPL regulations) that the rm takes into account when deciding
upon contract upgrading of a particular employee, irrespectively of how other temporary workers
perform.
Workers who get promoted to a permanent contract are assumed to receive a wage wP and exert
a xed level of work eort e, so that U(wP;e) = wP  e.9 In contrast with temporary jobs, which
are kept alive until their termination, permanent jobs are subject to an exogenous destruction
rate.
The remaining notation is as follows. Let V i and i; for i = fT;Pg; be the asset values of a worker
with contract i and of a rm with job i, respectively. Also V U and H denote the asset values for
the workers of being unemployed and for the rm of opening a vacancy (always consisting of a
temporary job), respectively.
2.1 Temporary jobs
We start by presenting the eort decision by temporary workers and then analyze rms' decisions
about the wage oer and conversion rates for workers on xed-term contracts. Workers choose
the level of eort, which is not contractible, that maximizes their expected utility discounted at
rate , given by,
V T = max
e fwT   e + [p(e)RV P + (1   p(e)R)V U]g: (2.1)
The rst-order condition (f.o.c) to this problem is,
p0(e)R[V P   V U]  1; (2.2)
with strict inequality if e = 0. Notice that the concavity of p(e), i.e. p00(e) < 0, ensures the
second-order condition (s.o.c) for the maximization of V T, namely p00(e)R[V P  V U] < 0, since,
8See Michelacci and Pijoan-Mas (2011) for an analysis of this alternative mechanism.
9As mentioned earlier, one way of modelling variable eort by workers with permanent contracts could be by
introducing the possibility of shirking in these jobs, as in G uell (2003) and Ichino and Riphan (2005). However,
since our focus here lies on the eort exerted by temporary workers, that would unnecessarily complicate the model
without qualitatively altering the main results. With shirking in permanent jobs, both types of workers would exert
lower eort when F is high but, since the incentive problems are bound to be more serious for temporary workers,
their eort will be lower that the one of permanent workers.
7as will be shown in section 2.2, V P > V U.
Next, since the level of eort is not enforceable, the rm chooses e, R and wT, subject to worker's
participation and incentive constraints, denoted in short as PAC and INC; respectively. Thus,
the rm's optimization problem becomes,
T = max
e;wT;R
ff(e)   wT + [p(e)RP + (1   p(e)R)H]g (2.3)
s:t:
V T  V U (PAC) (2.4)
p0(e)R[V P   V U]  1 (INC), (2.5)
where f(e) is the rm's production function, with f0 > 0; f00 < 0: The PAC guarantees that a
worker with a temporary contract gets at least the value of unemployment. If we restrict attention
to interior solutions, the f.o.c of the above-mentioned constrained maximization problem yield,
wT = e  
p(e)
p0(e)







V P   V U

= 1 (2.7)
p0(e)R[V P   V U] = 1: (2.8)
The asset value of being unemployed, V U in (2.1), is given by,
V U = b + [V T + (1   )V U]; (2.9)
where b is the unemployment income ow and  2 (0;1) is an (exogenous) hiring rate. Therefore,
use of the PAC with equality implies that V U = b=(1   ):
Next, dierentiating the INC with equality along the optimal contract yields,
p0(e)[V P   V U]dR + p00(e)R[V P   V U]de = 0;




(p0(e))2 [V P   V U]
p00(e)
> 0 (2.10)
Thus, under the previous assumptions, rms' temp-to-perm conversion rates and temporary work-
ers' eort are positively related. In other words, higher conversion rates induce higher eort and
vice versa. As an illustration, if we assume a hazard function of the form p(e) = e; with  2 (0;1)
8and e 2 [0;1]; which veries p(0) = 0; p(1)) = 1; p0(e) > 0 and p00(e) < 0, the variation in R and








The next step is to consider the decisions made by workers and rms with permanent jobs whose
asset values are respectively given by,
V P = wP   e + [(V U + F) + (1   )V P]: (2.12)
and
P = zf(e)   wP + [(H   F) + (1   )P]; (2.13)
where  2 (0;1) is an (exogenous) job destruction rate, F denotes a ring tax paid by the rm
to the worker upon dismissal, and z > 1 is an exogenous technology parameter which captures
larger productivity in these jobs. For simplicity, the level of eort exerted by permanent workers,
e; is assumed to be exogenously determined. Specically,  e is assumed to satisfy the following
two conditions: (i) f0(e) = 1=z < 1 and, (ii) zf(e)   e > b, which ensure that the expression
zf(e)   e   b is maximized. As will be later explained, this assumption, jointly with another
condition on F to be discussed below, guarantees positive prots for rms with permanent jobs.
The value of a new vacancy, assumed to consist of a temporary job, is given by,
H =  c + [V T + (1   )H]; (2.14)
where c > 0 is the cost of opening a vacancy and  is the vacancy lling rate which, like the hiring








where use has also been made of V T = V U.
Contrary to TCs, where wages are set by rms, it is assumed that the wage in a PC is determined
by Nash bargaining where  2 (0;1) denotes the worker's bargaining power. Thus,
[P   (H   F)] = (1   )[V P   (V U + F)]; (2.15)
Notice that rms will only promote a temporary worker to a PC if P  0 which implies that
ring costs cannot be too high since permanent workers' eort is assumed to be given: Indeed,
combining (2.13) with (2.15) leads to the following upper bound for F,
F 
(1   )[zf( e)    e   b]
1   (1   )
:
9where zf( e)  e b > 0, given the above-mentioned properties on how  e is determined. The above
inequality is assumed to hold in the sequel.
Next, use of (2.12)-(2.13) and (2.15), yields the wage obtained by workers with a PC,
wP = zf(e) + (1   )(e + b) + (1   )F; (2.16)
which leads to the following solutions for asset values in permanent jobs,
[V P   V U)] =
[zf(e)   e   b]
1   (1   )
+ F > 0;
P =
(1   )[zf(e)   e   b]
1   (1   )
  F > 0;
so that dV P
dF = 1 and dP
dF =  1: Notice that these two opposite results are just the outcome of
a hold-up problem whereby the worker, once employed with a PC, cannot credibly refrain from
exploiting an enhanced bargaining position. Consequently, the ring cost appears as negative in
the employer's threat point, H   F, but as positive in the workers' threat point, V U + F, in the
surplus sharing rule (2.15).
2.3 The eect of the ring-costs gap on eort and conversion rates
Finally, replacing the wage equation into (2.12) and (2.13) and using w.l.o.g. the specic hazard
function shown above to simplify the derivations, implies that (2.7) can be rewritten as,




zf(e)   e   b
[zf(e)   e   b] + [1   (1   )]F

: (2.17)









In other words, a higher value of F makes rms more reluctant to upgrade a TC into a PC which,
in turn, reduces the level of eort exerted by temporary workers in view of their lower chances of
getting promoted. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
10Proposition 1 Under our assumptions in (2.1), (2.3)-(2.5), and (2-12)-(2.15), an exogenous
increase in the ring costs gap between permanent and temporary workers, F, leads to a reduction
in both the optimal temp-perm conversion rate, R, decided by rms, and the optimal level of eort,
e, exerted by temporary workers.
Finally, by comparing the optimality condition in (2.17) with f0(e) = 1=z < 1; it is easy to check
that e < e for suciently large values of F relative to z, while e < e in the opposite situation.
Notice that this result could be used to explain the empirical results reported by Engellhandt and
Riphan (2005) on Swiss temporary workers exerting larger eort than permanent ones since, in
contrast to Spain, F is fairly low relative z in Switzerland.
2.4 Adding rm-specic paid-for- training to the model
We next check whether the previous conclusions remain robust once we incorporate the possibility
that rms also make decisions about how much to invest on paid{for training to their workers
under TC in order to improve the protability of permanent jobs. Whereas the z parameter
was earlier taken as exogenously given in the production function for rms oering PC, it is
now allowed to depend on the level of training provided by the rm to workers under the initial
TC. For tractability, it is assumed that there is a one-period lag in the eect of training on
worker's productivity, so that the latter only raises after the worker is renewed with a PC after
the expiration of the TC. Conversely, if the worker is dismissed, then he/she loses the received
training, as it is considered to be rm-specic. As a result, rms decide upon this level of training,
, where the cost of providing training is assumed to be linear in , i.e., c, with c > 0. Thus,
while productivity in a temporary job remains f(e), it becomes now g()f(e) in a permanent job,
instead of zf(e), where g0 > 0 and g00 < 0: This implies that, while V Premains the same as in
(2.12), P now changes to,
P() = g()f(e)   wP() + [(H   F) + (1   )P()]: (2.20)
Using the same Nash sharing rule as in (2.15), we get
P()   H =
(1   )[g()f(e)   e   b]
1   (1   )
  F; (2.21)
V P()   V U =
[g()f(e)   e   b]
1   (1   )
+ F: (2.22)
Regarding the asset values of workers and rms under TC, our previous assumption about the
time delay in the eect of training on productivity implies that, while workers face the same
11optimization problem as in (2.1), rms now have to account for the cost of training temporary
workers, so that their optimization problem becomes,
T = max
e;;wT;R
ff(e)   wT   c + [p(e)RP() + (1   p(e)R)H]g (2.23)
s:t:
V T()  V U (PAC) (2.24)
p0(e)R[V P()   V U]  1 (INC); (2.25)
where, using in the sequel for simplicity the specic hazard function discussed above, it follows
from (2.11) and the PAC with equality, that wT = e (e=)+b: Moreover, before presenting the










V P()   V U

: (2.26)
Now, using (2.26), the three f.o.c. of the maximization problem (2.23)-(2.25) become
p0(e)R[V P()   V U] = 1; (2.27)
[f0(e)   1] =  
1

[V P()   V U   F]





1   (1   )
= c[V P()   V U]2; (2.29)
where use has been made in (2.29) of @[F=[1  F
V P V u]=@ = [Fg0()f(e)]=[1 (1 )][V P  V U]2
which, in turn, follows from dierentiation of (2.22) w.r.t.  and F:
Next, dierentiating (2.28) w.r.t. e and ; holding F constant, and considering again (2.22),
yields,
f 00(e)de =  
g0()f(e)
[1   (1   )][V P()   V U]2d: (2.30)





f 00(e)[1   (1   )][V P()   V U]2 > 0; (2.31)
leading to the result that eort and training are positively related (i.e., they are complements)
in equilibrium. Further, it can be shown that dierentiation of (2.28) w.r.t. e,  and F, yields
de




dF < 0, so that an increase in F not only reduces
temporary workers' eort but also decreases the amount of paid-for training they receive from









D , where D = [g
0()f(e) e b]+[1 (1 )]F:
12rms. The last issue to be checked is the eect of F on R. For this, consider (2.27), where it can
be easily checked that, due to (2.22), a higher value of F increases [V P()   V U]; and therefore
decreases p0(e)R: Hence, since e is decreasing in F and p00(e) < 0, ip0(e) must go up. Therefore,
R has to go down, implying that dR
dF < 0. In sum, the signs of responses of both e and R to a
change in F remain the same as in Proposition 1 whereas, in addition,  decreases as F increases.
Hence, these results can be summarized as follows
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions in Proposition 1 and with rms being allowed to choose
paid-for training for temporary workers, an increase in F leads to lower training, besides lower
eort and conversion rates.
2.5 From the model to the data
Lacking any direct proxy for eort (or paid-for training) in our data set, our indirect strategy is
to relate workers' eort to rms' TFP, which can be estimated from rms' output and inputs.
For that, let us assume that each rm in the economy has the following constant-returns-to- scale
(CRS) Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function,11
Y = A(eLP)P(eLT)TX1 P T
where Y is nal output, A is an index of Harrod-neutral technical progress, e is eort of temporary
workers, e is eort by permanent workers12 (assumed to be constant as in the model), LP and LT
are hours of work by permanent and temporary workers, respectively, and X denotes additional
production inputs (i.e., capital and raw materials). Hence, using small letters to denote logs of
capital ones and labeling 0 = P lne, we can measure logged composite TFP at the rm level as
e a  a + 0 + T lne = y   PlP   TlT   (1   p   T)x, using estimates of the dierent input
elasticities. In this way, given a and e, TFP becomes a proxy for unobservable e. Our previous
results imply that, ceteris paribus, rms with higher conversion rates will exhibit higher TFP




@R > 0. Further, it is assumed that TFP also depends
on a vector of other determinants, z, to be described in Section 3, which aect its remaining
components, i.e., a and e. From these considerations, our benchmark model of rms' TFP in the
empirical section can be simply summarized as follows,
e a = e a(R;z); (2.32)
11The choice of a (multiplicative) Cobb-Douglas production function is justied in our case because no rm in
the data set has zero temporary or permanent contracts. Otherwise, LP and LT would need to be additive in a
labour composite.
12In a broader sense,  e could also be interpreted as a combined index comprising not only permanent workers'
eort but also their level of paid-for training they received before being promoted. However, to simplify matters,
we will only refer to eort in the sequel.
13to which a disturbance term capturing unobserved components of TFP should appended (see
section 3.2). Since e a and R are endogenous variables, our strategy is to exploit natural experiments
implied by three major labour market reforms in Spain implemented in 1994, 1997 and 2002,
respectively, where the gap between the ring costs of permanent and temporary workers, F,
was changed. As will be discussed below, once we control for other observable characteristics at
the rm level (like rm's size), our implicit identication strategy of the eect of R on e a is that
an exogenous and fairly unexpected change in F will aect R in each rm dierently depending
on their share of temporary jobs, dened as tw (= LT=(LP + LT)), before the reform. In other
words, rms' dierences in tw just before the reforms took place are bound to induce heterogeneous
variation in R and, through this channel, changes in F will aect e a across rms.
3 Data
Our microdata at the rm level come from the Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre
Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE). This is an annual survey on a representative sample of Spanish
manufacturing rms which has the advantage of providing the information required to compute
temp-to-perm conversion rates (see below). The available sample period is 1991-2005. Firms
were chosen in the base year according to a sampling scheme applied to each industry in the
manufacturing sector where weights depend on their size category. While all manufacturing rms
with more than 200 employees are surveyed and their participation rate in the survey reaches
approximately 70%, smaller rms with 10 to 200 employees are surveyed according to a random
sampling scheme with a participation rate close to 5%.
Another important feature of the survey is that the initial sampling properties have been main-
tained throughout all subsequent years. Newly created and exiting rms have been recorded in
each year with the same sampling criteria as in the base year. As a result of this entry and exit
process, the data set is an unbalanced panel where the number of rms is 3,759 while the number
of rm-year observations is 22,292. Further details about the criteria used to select our specic
sample are presented in the Appendix.
3.1 Temporary work
Table 1 shows the share of temporary workers by industry, size and age category. With regard to
size category, small rms are dened as those with less than 50 employees, while medium-sized
and large rms are those with more than 50 but less than 200 employees, and more than 200
employees, respectively. Regarding age categories, young rms are dened as those which have
14been operating during less than 5 years since they were opened, while mature rms are those
which have been operating for a longer period.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
As can be observed in the Table, the share of temporary workers exhibits large variability across
industries, age and size categories. Within each industry, in general, small and medium-sized
young rms exhibit a larger share of this type of contracts. This is traditionally rationalized by
the fact that newer rms are bound to make a more widespread use of exible temporary contracts
for precautionary reasons since they are likely to face a higher probability of failure.
Next, we proceed to describe the computation of both rms' TFP and conversion rates.
3.2 TFP
As regards TFP, we construct a measure based on the generalization proposed by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003, henceforth LP) of the well-known Olley and Pakes' (1996) approach to estimate the
parameters of production functions using inputs to control for unobservables.
As will become clear below, the reason for adopting this approach, rather than computing the
conventional Solow residuals, is that the use of the latter invalidates our strategy to identify
heterogeneity across rms in the eect of changes in F at the nationwide level on R and then on
TFP (through e and ) at the rm level. In a nutshell, the idea is that rms which have a higher
proportion of temporary workers (tw) before changes in F take place will be more aected by these
changes than rms with a lower proportion. Yet, this requires that tw does not directly aect
TFP. It only does so indirectly through its eects on R, a condition which will not be satised
if we were to compute Solow residuals from the available information on output and inputs in
our data set. In eect, given our assumption about a CRS-CD production function, the standard
Solow procedure to compute rm i's (logged) TFP level in period t; denoted by e ait; would be as
follows,
e ait = yit   PlPit   TlTit   mmit   kkit; (3.1)
where y is logged nal output; lP, lT;m and k are logged labour (hours of work) by permanent
and temporary workers, respectively, materials, and capital weighted by its logged annual average
capacity utilization rate reported by each rm; and x (x = flP;lT;m;kg) are input elasticities
which satisfy P + T + m + k = 1 under CRS.13.
13Final output is measured as the value of produced goods and services deated with each rm's output price
index; capital, as as rm's value of the capital stock deated using the price index of investment in equipment
15The problem with this approach is that, lacking information on the dierent cost shares of perma-
nent and temporary workers (payrolls reported in ESEE do not distinguish between wages paid by
type of contract), we would end up having a measure of e a that is contaminated by tw, invalidating
the use of this variable in the construction of IVs required to estimate (2.32) consistently. To see
this, let us rewrite the production function as Y = A(eLP=L)P(eLT=L)TLP+TX1 P T,
with L = LP + LT: Thus, taking logs and recalling that tw = LT=L , e a would be dened as,
e a = y   (P + T)l   kk   (1   P   T   k)m =
= a + 0 + T[lne + ln(tw)] + P ln(1   tw);
so that e a depends on tw, and we cannot assume an exclusion restriction for this variable or its
lagged value in a regression equation explaining e a.
To overcome this problem, we follow instead LP's (2003) approach, where it is assumed that e ait
can be expressed as the sum of two unobserved components,
e ait = !it + it; (3.2)
such that !it represents a rm-specic component which is known to the rm, while it is an
idiosyncratic component unknown to the rm but with no impact on rm's decisions. The endo-
geneity problem in estimating the production function by OLS arises from the correlation of !it
with the input choices. LP (2003) follow Olley and Pakes (1996) in considering k as a quasi-xed
input and lP;lT and m as freely adjustable inputs. Olley and Pakes' (1996) original approach re-
lied upon the assumption that investment, i, installed in period t only becomes productive at t+1,
so that iit = i(!it;kit) can be inverted to yield !it = !t(iit;kit) under the assumption of increas-
ing monotonicity of iit in !it. Yet, instead of using the investment demand function, LP (2003)
advocate to invert the materials' demand function mit = m(!it;kit) to obtain !it = !t(mit;kit),
also under monotonicity plus some additional assumptions.14. The justication for this alterna-
tive choice is that, while most rms (99.3% in our case) report positive expenditure on materials
every year, a much lower proportion (about 52% in our sample) undertake investment every year,
implying a severe eciency loss when about half of the sample of rms needs to be truncated.
In what follows we briey describe the details of LP's (2003) procedure to estimate our (logged)
production function,
yit = PlPit + TlTit + t(mit;kit) + it; (3.3)
such that t(mit;kit) = 0+kkit+mmit+!t(mit;kit): Equation (3.3) is estimated by OLS in the
rst stage using a third-order polynomial in mit and kit with constant slopes over time. However,
goods; materials, as the value of intermediate consumption deated by a rm's price index of materials. Finally,
following Hall (1990), the input elasticities would correspond to.rms' average cost shares over our sample period,
which are available in ESEE.
14For example, input prices are assumed to be common across rms.
16we allow for time-variant intercepts (by means of binary time dummies) to get time variation
in e which, for simplicity, was earlier assumed to be constant. The estimates b P and b T will
consistently identify the two labour elasticities P and T. Next, following Olley and Pakes (1996),
it is assumed that !it follows a rst-order Markov process, leading to !it = g(!it 1). Although
g(:) has been specically chosen to be a fourth-order polynomial in our empirical implementation,
we will consider a simple AR(1) process !it = !it 1 + "it, where "it is i.i.d., to briey illustrate
the second stage of the procedure which yields the remaining input elasticities. By dening
e yit = yit   b PlPit   b TlTit, and taking into account that !it 1 = !t 1(mit 1;kit 1); it holds that,
e yit = 
0 + kkit + mmit +
+[t 1(mit 1;kit 1)   kkit 1   mmit 1] + it + "it: (3.4)
This is the equation estimated by NLS in the second stage, using the predicted values for e yit
and t 1(mit 1;kit 1) obtained from the rst-stage estimation. As LP (2003) have shown, this
second stage leads to consistent estimates of k and m. Notice that, since the predicted values
have been used for e yit and t 1(:;:), the standard errors of the estimated coecients in (3.4)
should be corrected by bootstrap. We implement this procedure separately for each of the 18
manufacturing industries included in our data set. In Table 2 we report the estimates of the
parameters, where CRS is imposed in all instances since the null hypothesis that the sum of the
four input elasticities is equal to unity cannot be rejected at typical signicance levels in all cases.
Overall, the coecients on labour, capital and materials are in line with those available in the
literature using data on Spanish rms (see, e.g, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2010, and
Gonz alez and Miles, 2011) though a novelty in this paper is that we distinguish between the
elasticities of permanent and temporary labour in the production function. Our estimates point
out that the former tends to be about 4 to 5 times larger than the latter in most industries.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3.2.1 Conversion rates
Our data set provides direct information on the types of contracts used by rms in each year of
the sample, from which conversion rates at the rm level can be retrieved. In eect, we have
data on the number of permanent and temporary workers in rm i at period t (LP;it and LT;it,
respectively), as well as on the number of permanent contracts which have been signed in each year
by workers who previously held temporary contracts in the rm. This is denoted as LTP;it where
the subscript "TP" signies conversion from "T" to "P". Using this information, we compute
annual conversion rates as Rit = LTP;it =LT;it 1: On average, it yields an estimate of R equal
to 0:118; that is, about 12% of temporary workers get permanent contracts when their contracts
17expire. Interestingly, this value is quite close to the conversion rates reported in other available
studies in Spain about this topic which use information from aggregate labour surveys (see Alba-
Ram rez, 1994, Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, 2001, and G uell and Petrongolo, 2007) whose estimates
range between 10% and 15%.
Figure 2 displays the histogram of the estimated conversion rates. About 85% of rms exhibit
conversion rates between 0% and 20%, and only 3% of rms exhibit rates above 50%. Industries
like \Vehicles and motors", \Textiles and apparels" and \Paper and printing products" are the
ones exhibiting the higher conversion rates whilst other industries, like \Food and tobacco", ex-
hibit very low rates. In sum, this evidence points out that, in general, Spanish manufacturing
rms have been rather reluctant to oer contract conversions, most plausibly due to the large
EPL gap between permanent and temporary workers.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3.3 Conversion rates and TFP: A descriptive (nonparametric) bivariate anal-
ysis
To motivate the econometric analysis undertaken later in Section 4.1, we start by evaluating
whether there are signicant dierences in the distribution of TFP across rms with dierent con-
version rates. To do so, we follow the nonparametric approach proposed by Delgado et al. (2002)
in their analysis of productivity dierences between exporting and non-exporting manufacturing
rms in Spain. In our slightly dierent setup, we test the null hypothesis that the c.d.f.'s of TFP
in rms with low and high conversion rates are identical, against the alternative of stochastic
dominance.
The initial stage in this procedure is to construct a TFP index at the rm level that measures
the proportional dierence of TFP in rm i at time t relative to a given (articial) reference
rm in each industry. As shown in Delgado et al. (2002), this index allows to pool observations
across dierent industries, facilitating comparison on a homogeneous basis of TFP in dierent
rms. The reference rm in a given industry j is dened as the rm which satises the following
properties over the entire sample period: (i) its output is equal to the geometric mean of rms'
output quantities in industry j; (ii) its input quantities are equal to the geometric means of rms'
input quantities in industry j; and (iii) its input elasticities equal to the arithmetic mean of the
elasticities obtained by the LP's (2003) approach in industry j. Hence, if rm i belongs to the
18size group  and to industry j, its logged TFP index at time t is given by:
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(xj   xj); (3.5)
where x = flP;lT;m;kg; j = 1;2;:::;18; =fsmall & medium-sized, largeg; 15 and, for a generic
variable zit (= yit, x





t=1 zit1[i 2 size group ]1[i 2 industry j]; and





t=1 zit1[i 2 industry j] where 1[] is an indicator function.
As shown earlier in Table 1, young manufacturing rms tend to hire a larger proportion of tem-
porary workers that more mature rms. Given that the former may be less productive than the
latter, a potential concern is that TFP gaps may just reect dierences in rms' age and not
in their fraction of temporary workers (see Fari~ nas and Ruano, 2004). For this reason, Figure 3
displays the empirical c.d.f's of the estimated TFP index ~ a in the four categories of rms which
result from combining the two age (young and mature) and the two size (small & medium sized,
and large) groups. In each of the four panels, the dashed line corresponds to rms with conversion
rates below a preset threshold, whereas the solid line represents those rms with conversion rates
above that threshold value. This threshold value is set to be equal to 8% (approximately the
average level of the conversion rate in all sectors of the Spanish economy throughout the sample
period). Admittedly, this choice is somewhat arbitrary, but we have experimented with other
choices ranging from 5% to 15% obtaining very similar results. As can be observed, the c.d.f.
of the TFP index for rms with conversion rates above 8% lies to the right of the c.d.f. of the
TFP index for those with less than 8% in three out of the four cases, implying that the former
are seemingly more productive than the latter. The only exception holds for the group of young,
large rms, which might be due to the low proportion of such rms in our sample (only 276 out
of 22,292 observations).
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The next step is to test formally whether these gaps in the c.d.f.'s are statistically signicant. We
apply the nonparametric test of (rst-order) stochastic dominance (SD) proposed by Delgado et
al (2002) which works as follows. Let Ft and Gt denote the c.d.f. of the TFP index in period t of
15Due the selective sampling scheme in our data set, in what follows we restrict the three rm-size categories
discussed above to two broader groups: small & medium-sized (less than 200 employees), and large rms (more
than 200 employees).
19rms with conversion rates in period t below and above preset thresholds, respectively.16 We test
for SD in each size category, , by conditioning the distributions Ft and Gt on a given size group
0 with 0 = fsmall & medium-sized; largeg; and a given age group 0 with 0 = fyoung and
matureg.17 Then, the distribution Ft(j = 0; = 0) stochastically dominates the distribution
Gt(j = 0; = 0) if the null hypothesis Ha
0 : Ft(j = 0; = 0) = Gt(j = 0; = 0)
(two-sided test) is rejected and Hb
0 : Ft(j = 0; = 0) > Gt(j = 0; = 0) (one-sided test) is
not rejected. In each period, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for these one- and two-sided
















where n and m denote, respectively, the sample size of rms with conversion rates below and
above the threshold values, N = n+m, and TN(~ ai) = Fn(~ ai) Gm(~ ai), with Fn and Gm being the
empirical counterparts of F and G (although the time subindex is omitted to simplify notation,
the comparison always takes place in each period). The limiting distributions of these statistics
are known under independence (see Delgado et al., 2002).18
For brevity, we discuss here the results of the SD test conditioning on size, namely Ft(j = 0)
against Gt(j = 0), which are reported in Table 3. For the group of small & medium- sized rms,
we nd that Ha
0 can be rejected at the 5% signicance level in every year between 1992 and 2005,
while the hypothesis that the sign of the dierence is favourable to rms with a higher conversion
rate (Hb
0) can always be rejected at any reasonable signicance level. In the case of large rms,
Ha
0 can be rejected except in 1992 and 1993. Further, in all the remaining years Hb
0 cannot be
rejected. Similar results hold when conditioning on rms' age.19
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, these preliminary ndings point out that the TFP distribution of rms with higher conver-
sion rates (above our threshold of 8%) stochastically dominates the corresponding distribution of
rms with lower conversion rates. Yet, there are two shortcomings when interpreting this evidence
as fully supportive for our model. First, it ignores other factors, captured by z in (2.32), that may
also aect the link between conversion rates and rms' TFP, like e.g., R&D expenditure, workers'
16We use the distributions in each year because observations have to be independent and this condition is not
satised if we pool observations of the same rm in dierent years.
17Notice that, since the TFP index removes the dierence in productivity between rms' in dierent industries,
we are in fact not only controlling for age and size, but also for industry.






2) and limN!1 P(N > v) = exp( 2v
2), respectively. For more details, see Darling
(1957).
19These results are available upon request.
20educational attaintment, etc. Secondly, and foremost, it just captures a relationship between a
pair of variables without identifying a causal link. After all, it may well be that less productive
rms oer lower conversion rates rather than the other way around.20 Given these caveats, the
next step is to use a parametric panel regression approach to estimate equation (2.32) in order to
check whether a causal interpretation holds once we are able to identify valid instruments for the
eect of conversion rates on TFP.
4 Panel regression
To evaluate the impact of the ring-cost gap on manufacturing rms' TFP, via its eect on
conversion rates, we regress our estimate of TFP, e a, on R plus a set of additional controls in the
following dynamic panel data model at the rm level,
e ait = i + t + e ai;t 1 + Rit + 0zit + vit; (4.1)
where i and t are rm xed eects and time eects, respectively, while vit is an i.i.d. error term.
As discussed earlier, the vector zit contains a set of controls which are likely to aect the a and
e components of e a:21 It includes an index of skilled human capital available at the rm level (i.e.,
the proportion of employees with a college degree), size, age and its square, a dummy variable for
incorporated companies, the proportion of foreign capital, the proportion of public capital, two
indicators on whether the rm perceives it operates in an expansive or recessive market, R&D
expenditure by the rm, industry dummies, rm' s entry, exit, merger and scission dummies.22
Detailed denitions of these variables can be found in the Appendix. Lastly, since TFP levels are
highly persistent over time, we also include a lagged dependent variable.
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics of the variables in (4.1). As can be seen, there is a large
and persistent slowdown in rms' TFP growth since 2000 leading to even a negative growth
rate in 2005. This path is somewhat similar to the one discussed in the Introduction for the
overall market economy, although much less dramatic than in other sectors |like construction,
distribution, personal and social services| where TFP growth has become negative since the mid-
nineties (see Escrib a and Murgui, 2009). It is also noteworthy that the average share of temporary
workers in our sample is about 23%, namely, around 10 pp. lower than the aggregate share for
20Yet, very similar results hold when we use an average of Rit 1 and Rit as a predetermined variable since most
reforms took place in the middle of the year.
21Notice that, to the extent that some of these covariates capture changes in eort of permanent workers, our
identication strategy will capture variations in the relative eort exerted by temporary workers vis- a-vis permanent
ones.
22These variables take value 1 in all the periods in which the rm appears in our sample.
21the Spanish economy during the whole sample period, given that seasonal activities associated to
the manufacturing industry are much less prevalent than in the services and construction sectors.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
According to our model, the main driving force behind the positive correlation between temporary
workers' eort and rms' conversion rates is a change in the gap of ring costs between permanent
and temporary workers. During the available sample period, there have been three major EPL
reforms following the introduction of widespread temporary contracts in 1984.
The rst one took place in May 1994 (Law 10/94), which relaxed the conditions for "fair" dismissals
of permanent workers, and restricted conditions for the use of temporary contracts. Regarding
the former, fair dismissals |involving redundancy pay of 20 days' wages per year of seniority
(dpys) with a maximum of 12 months, against a pay of 45 dpys with a maximum of 42 months
of wages for "unfair" dismissals| that could only be used for economic reasons, also qualied
for organizational and technological reasons. As regards conditions for the use of temporary
contracts, the most popular temporary contract, i.e., the so-called contrato de fomento (with a
maximum duration of 3 years) was abolished, except for some disadvantaged groups of workers.
Overall, we interpret this reform as lowering F. The next reform was implemented in May 1997
(Law Decrees 8 and 9/97) reducing the above-mentioned mandatory redundancy pay in case of
"unfair" dismissals to 33 dpys with a maximum of 24 months of wages for most new hires, with
the exception of workers aged 30-44 years old whose unemployment spells were below one year.
In parallel, a new severance payment of 8 dpys, instead of no ring cost, was implemented for
temporary workers whose xed-term contracts were not renewed and signicant rebates of social
security contributions were also introduced for conversions or direct hires under the new permanent
contract (see Dolado et al., 2002).23 All in all, we interpret again this reform as one where F was
signicantly reduced.
Finally, in December 2002 (Law 45/02), the use of the new 33 dpys contracts was extended to the
hiring of new workers aged 16-30 years old (instead of 18-29) as well as of the unemployed with
more than 6 months. However, the most important change in this reform was the abolition of
the rm's obligation to pay interim wages when dismissed workers appealed to labour courts, as
long as the the rm acknowledged the dismissal to be unfair and deposited the highest severance
pay (45 dpys) in court two days before the dismissal. It is arguable whether this reform meant a
reduction in F since, although the extension of the new contract aimed to do so, many excessively
risk-averse employers may have ended up paying much higher ring costs than the statutory ones
(under "fair" dismissals) to avoid the uncertainty of going to court.
23The rebates ranged from 40% to 60% during the rst two years of the new contracts used to hire workers in
some targeted groups (youth, long-term unemployed, and women under-represented in some industries).
22In line with the previous discussion, the idea is to use these three reforms separately as natural
experiments to generate exogenous changes in F which subsequently would aect R without
having a direct eect on e a, i.e., fullling the required exclusion properties for a valid instrument.
In principle, we would construct three dummy variables denoted F1, F2 and F3 which take the
value 1 from the year after the implementation of the reforms (1995, 1998 and 2003, respectively)
onwards, and zero before those dates. However, one important problem with these indicators is
that, capturing nationwide reforms, they would hardly correlate well with the situation of each
particular rm. For example, a rm with very few temporary workers and another with plenty
of them will benet very dierently from the reforms. To address this problem, we use the
interactions of the three reform dummies with the value of the rate of temporary workers in the
year before the reform took place, denoted as twit 1: This leads to the choice of three interacted
indicators, denoted respectively as F1it 1 ,F2it 1 and F3it 1, as the corresponding IVs with
variation both across rms and over time. Notice that, since we also control for rm's size, our
comparison focuses on rms with equal size but with a rather dierent number of temporary
workers.
4.1 Estimation method
Since the dependent variable in (4.1), e ait; is usually very persistent, our estimation method relies
on Blundell and Bond's (1998) System-GMM which consists of the estimation of a system of two
simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged levels as instruments) and the other in rst
dierences (with lagged rst dierences as instruments). We use as IVs the three reform dummies
interacted with twit 1; plus the remaining variables in (4.1) lagged twice (except size, age and its
square). As shown in the rst column of Table 5, the choice of FSit 1; (S = 1;2;3) as our key
IVs is seemingly validated by the relatively high partial R2's in the rst-stage OLS regressions of
Rit on these three dummies, where the remaining lagged IVs in (4.1) have also been included. We
nd that the three FSit 1 turn out to be strongly signicant and that, while F1it 1 and F2it 1
have large positive estimated coecients (in line with their attempt to reduce that ring cost
gap), F3it 1 exhibits a smaller negative one, pointing out that, in net terms, the EPL reform in
2002 increased F. These results are supported by the scatter plots displayed in Figure 4 which
depict conversion rates the year before and after each of the three reforms, together with the 45
degree line, for each of the 72 cells of rms which result from combining industry (18), size (2)
and age (2) categories.
Finally, as a robustness check on our identication strategy, we depict a similar scatter plot in
Figure 5 for a placebo reform taking place in 1999, namely, a year when there was no change in
EPL regulations. As can be observed, the observations are neither above the 45o line (as in the
1994 and 1997 reforms) nor below it (as in 2002). Further, when adding a similar reform dummy
23variable interacted with twit 1 at that year (denoted by F4t 1) in the second column of Table 5,
its coecient turns out to be highly insignicant.
[TABLE 5 & FIGUREs 4 & 5 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Empirical results
Table 6 reports the estimated coecients of the controls in equation (4.1). For comparison,
columns [1] and [2] present specications including and excluding twit 1; respectively, in the list
of regressors as to check the validity as IV of this key component of our three interacted reform
dummies.24 Finally, in column [3], estimates are shown for a specication where the placebo
interacted dummy variable F4it 1 is also included as an IV. Notice that, in all specications, the
Sargan m1 and m2 tests for MA(1) and MA(2) in the rst-dierenced disturbances point out that
the choice of the second lags as IVs is not rejected.
The main ndings are as follows. First, twit 1 does not appear signicantly in column [1] con-
rming our identication strategy. Secondly, and foremost, the eect of Rit on e ait is positive and
highly signicant in both columns [1] and [3] when the whole set of controls is considered. The
estimated coecient on Rit in column [2] is 0.119 (t-ratio: 4.90). Finally, the estimates in columns
[2] and [3] are very similar, pointing out the the placebo dummy does not provide any additional
explanatory power.
If we were to take this point estimate at face value, we could compute the fraction of the slowdown
in TFP growth during 1992-2005 (from 1.52% in 1992 to -0.17% in 2005, that is, a decrease of
1.67 pp.) which is due, ceteris paribus, to the fall in the conversion rate (from 12.2% in 1992 to
10.3 in 2005, that is, a decrease of 1.9 pp.). Once the dynamic eects of the AR(1) in (4.1) are
considered, our simulation results imply that the observed decline in conversion rates explains
0.32 pp. of the 1.67 pp. reduction in TFP growth, namely about 20 percent. Alternatively, if a
future (after 2005) labour market reform entailing reduction in the ring-cost gap were to increase
temp-to-perm conversion rates, say from 10.3% to 15%, TFP growth rates for manufacturing rms
would raise from -0.17% to 0.55% in ve years. These are admittedly not very large eects, since
we keep constant all the other determinants of TFP, but they are unambiguously relevant.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
24In column [1], only second lags of the regressors are used as IVs, whereas in column [2] the three reform dummies
interacted with twit 1 are also added to the set of IVs.
245 Conclusions
Since the early nineties, Spain has been the EU country with the highest proportion of temporary
workers, with more than twice the average share in the EU-15. In parallel, it has suered from a
drastic productivity slowdown since the mid-1990s. In this paper we document the relationship
between these two stylized features using an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing rms
from 1991 to 2005. To interpret the empirical evidence, we build a simple model of a two-
tier labour market in which temporary workers choose their level of eort in order to maximize
expected utility while rms choose their temp-to-perm conversion rates to maximize prots, facing
a sizeable ring-cost gap between permanent and temporary workers. The main implication is
that both temporary workers' eort and rms' conversion rates decrease as the ring- cost gap
increases. Further, we also show that the higher is the ring-cost gap, rms have less incentive to
provide paid-for training to temporary workers. Since workers' eort and training can be thought
of as components of TFP, it is through this mechanism that dual EPL aects TFP developments.
Our empirical ndings imply that, all else equal, up to 20% of the the slowdown of TFP growth
in Spanish manufacturing rms could be explained by the reduction in conversion rates and that
if a future labour market reform were to increase the conversion rate by around 5 pp. per year,
TFP growth would pick up from current (as of 2005) -0.17% to about 0.55 pp. in ve years.
One shortcoming of our empirical approach is the lack of direct information on workers' eort
or rms' paid-for training which are embedded in a measure of TFP. Yet, even in the absence of
direct information on these variables, the results obtained in this paper shed some light on how
dual EPL in two-tier labour markets may have sizeable detrimental eects on rms' productivity.
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27Part II
Appendix: Data and denition of variables
5.1 Sample selection rules
We follow ve rules for dropping rms or observations, namely, we exclude those rms that: (i)
change from one industry to another because their TFP in dierent moments of time is not com-
parable; (ii) report observations with negative value added or negative intermediate consumption
or with ratios of labour cost to sales or material cost to sales larger than unity; (iii) report an
incomplete exercise in a year dierent than the one in which it leaves the market; and nally (iv)
do not report all the information required to compute TFP or only provides that information for
a single year.
5.2 Variable denitions
 Output: Value of the produced goods and services computed as sales plus the variation of
inventories deated by the rm's price index of output.
 Permanent workers: Workers hired under an indenite contract until December 31st of each
year.
 Temporary workers: Workers hired under a xed-term contract until December 31st.
 Conversions from temporary to permanent contracts: Number of workers promoted to an
indenite contract who had a temporary contract at the same rm before December 31st.
of the previous year.
 Total eective worked hours: Computed as the number of workers times the average hours
per worker. The average hours per worker is computed as the normal hours plus average
overtime minus average working time lost at the workplace.
 Materials: Value of intermediate consumption deated by the rm's price index of materials.
 Capital: Capital at current replacement values is computed recursively from an initial esti-
mate and the data on current investments in equipment goods (but not buildings or nancial
assets) applying the recursive formula, Kit = (1 d) PIt
PI;t 1Ki;t 1+Ii;t, where d is an industry-
specic rate of depreciation and PIt a price index of investment in equipment goods. Real
capital is obtained by deating capital at current replacement values with the price index of
28investment in equipment goods. For more details and descriptive statistics on this variable
see Escribano and Stucchi (2008).
 Investment: Value of current investment in equipment goods.
 Wages: Firm's hourly wage rate (total labour cost divided by eective total hours of work)
deated by the rm's price index of output.
 Capital usage cost: Weighted sum of long term interest rate with banks and other long term
debt plus the industry-specic depreciation rate minus the investment ination rate.
 Index of human capital: Proportion of workers with an enginnering or other college degrees.
 Age: The age of the rm is the dierence between the current year and the year of birth
declared by the rm.
 Size: Three categories. Firms with more than 200 employees (Large rms) and rms with
less than 200 but more that 50 employees (Medium size rms) and rms with less than 50
employees (Small rms).
 Industry: Firms are classied in 18 industries. See Table 2.
 R&D investment: Value of current investment in R&D.
 Expansive/ Recessive Market: Dummy variables that take value 1 when the rm reports
that its market is in expansion/recession and 0 otherwise.
29Table 1. Proportion of temporary workers by rm's age and size
Small and Medium-sized rms (less than 200 employees)
Mean SD Obs
Less than 5 years in the market 41:5 31:0 2641
More than 5 years in the market 20:4 22:1 12;833
Large rms (more than 200 employees)
Mean SD Obs
Less than 5 years in the market 18:5 22:7 276
More than 5 years in the market 15:4 16:5 6;542
Source: ESEE (1991-205)
30Table 2. Estimates of input elasticities with Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach
INDUSTRY p T k m N Na
Ferric and Non Ferric Metals 0.252*** 0.065*** 0.098*** 0.585*** 739 716
Non Metallic Mineral Products 0.168*** 0.056*** 0.094*** 0.682*** 1675 1541
Chemical Products 0.288*** 0.046** 0.187*** 0.479*** 1616 1503
Metallic Products 0.320*** 0.094*** 0.202*** 0.384*** 2050 1886
Agricultural and Industrial Machinery 0.289*** 0.126*** 0.057*** 0.528*** 1473 1399
Oce Machinery, Data Processing Machinery, etc. 0.325*** 0.094** 0.083** 0.498*** 364 345
Electrical Material and Electrical Accessories 0.282*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.513*** 1586 1475
Vehicles and Motors 0.292*** 0.073** 0.102*** 0.533*** 1117 1050
Other Transport Material 0.214*** 0.085** 0.121*** 0.580*** 463 444
Meat and Meat Products 0.254*** 0.072*** 0.089** 0.585*** 680 646
Food and Tobacco 0.204*** 0.076*** 0.159*** 0.561*** 2322 2136
Beverages 0.202*** 0.071** 0.087*** 0.640*** 511 475
Textiles and Apparels 0.286*** 0.114*** 0.073*** 0.527*** 2421 2251
Leather products and shoes 0.185*** 0.088** 0.138*** 0.589*** 772 710
Wood and Furniture 0.289*** 0.099*** 0.183*** 0.429*** 1829 1683
Paper, Paper Products and Printing Products 0.238*** 0.053*** 0.093*** 0.616*** 1949 1813
Plastic Products and Rubber 0.308*** 0.086*** 0.113*** 0.493*** 1004 943
Other Manufactured Products 0.307*** 0.085*** 0.072** 0.464*** 551 523
Notes: *  signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. CRS are not rejected in all cases with p-values
always exceeding 0:20; N is the number of rms in each industry; Na denotes the number of available
observations satisfying the assumptions of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
31Table 3. TFP dierences between rms with low and high temp-to-perm conversion rates
No. of rms Equality of Dns. Di. favourable to rms with R > 8%
%R  8% %R 8% Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Small & Medium Sized Firms
1992 346 705 0,098 0,038 0.008 0,946
1993 357 652 0,093 0,044 0,003 0,996
1994 313 613 0,120 0,006 0,000 1,000
1995 274 577 0,157 0,000 0,011 0,954
1996 305 582 0,122 0,006 0,005 0,991
1997 427 684 0,133 0,000 0,009 0,958
1998 401 611 0,116 0,004 0,002 0,997
1999 433 591 0,153 0,000 0,004 0,994
2000 440 547 0,150 0,000 0,003 0,996
2001 417 504 0,117 0,005 0,002 0,998
2002 436 447 0,144 0,000 0,002 0,998
2003 374 313 0,139 0,003 0,007 0,983
2004 374 307 0,103 0,060 0,007 0,985
2005 545 470 0,093 0,028 0,006 0,985
Large Firms
1992 224 274 0,051 0,914 - -
1993 224 197 0,058 0,888 - -
1994 194 205 0,094 0,041 0,127 0,924
1995 180 198 0,169 0,000 0,011 0,980
1996 176 174 0,144 0,000 0,033 0,840
1997 180 202 0,097 0,037 0,037 0,793
1998 175 192 0,098 0,038 0,042 0,704
1999 176 168 0,092 0,047 0,049 0,667
2000 201 255 0,148 0,027 0,019 0,935
2001 187 205 0,187 0,005 0,015 0,962
2002 193 178 0,111 0,004 0,008 0,987
2003 175 139 0,118 0,006 0,002 0,998
2004 157 154 0,110 0,005 0,008 0,967
2005 192 209 0,135 0,004 0,009 0,985
Notes: Firms' TFP measured using the TFP index, ~ a, dened in equation (3.5).
32Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the sample
Mean S.D.
Average TFP growth 1992-1995 (in percent) 1:60 |
Average TFP growth 1996-2000 (in percent) 1:56 |
Average TFP growth 2001-2005 (in percent) 0:40 |
Average change in share of temp workers 1992-1995 1:53 |
Average change in share of temp workers 1996-2000  1:12 |
Average change in share of temp workers 2001-2005  1:08 |
Average conversion rate 1992-1995 12:55 |
Average conversion rate 1996-2000 12:78 |
Average conversion rate 2001-2005 10:30 |
Percentage of temporary workers 22:99 22:85
Percentage of foreign capital 16:87 35:73
Percentage of workers with a college degree 4:05 6:78
R&D Expenditure / Sales (in percentage) 0:69 2:2
Age (in years) 24:11 20:48
Percentage of incorporated companies 64:94 47:72
Percentage of entrants 7:03 25:57
Percentage of exiting rms 1:32 11:4
Percentage of rms with scission 0:66 8:09
Percentage of rms involved in a merger process 1:42 11:85
Percentage of rms reporting expansive market 29:03 45:39
Percentage of rms reporting recessive market 20:56 40:42
Source: ESEE (1991-2005)
33Table 5. First-stage estimates
[1] [2]
F1  tw 1 0:133 0:141
[0:036] [0:034]
F2  tw 1 0:109 0:115
[0:031] [0:030]
F3  tw 1  0:053  0:051
[0:025] [0:024]
F4  tw 1 | 0:007
[0:015]
No. obs. 15792 15792
Partial R-squared 0:46 0:45
Notes: S.e's in brackets. Estimation method: OLS. Additional regressors: IVs in Table 6; * signicant at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
34Table 6. System-GMM estimates of determinants of rms' TFP
Variables [1] [2] [3]
Conversion rate in t 0:123 0:119 0:120
[0:026] [0:024] [0:024]
Proportion of temporary workers in t   1  0:028 | |
[0:022] | |
(logged) TFP in t   1 0:340 0:315 0:321
[0:059] [0:057] [0:050]
Proportion of workers with college degree in t   1 0:027 0:050 0:051
[0:016] [0:023] [0:025]
R&D Expenditure (logged) in t   1 0:003 0:003 0:003
[0:001] [0:001] [0:001]
Proportion of public capital in t   1 0:005 0:004 0:04
[0:005] [0:004] [0:004]
Proportion of foreign capital in t   1 0:012 0:012 0:012
[0:004] [0:004] [0:004]
Incorporated company in t   1  0:014  0:022  0:023
[0:027] [0:017] [0:021]
Age 0:026 0:031 0:032
[0:019] [0:015] [0:015]
Age Sq.  0:001  0:001  0:004
[0:003] [0:002] [0:003]
No. obs. 15792 15792 15792
Partial R-squared 0:93 0:92 0:94
Sargant Test
m1 Test (p-value) 0:023 0:031 0:017
m2 Test (p-value) 0:392 0:315 0:517
Notes: S.e's in brackets. Estimation method: System GMM: Dependent variable, (logged) TFP.
Additional regressors: Industry, Size, Year, Entry, Exit, Merger and Scission dummies; IVs are second
lags (except for size, age and its square) in column [1] plus reform dumies interacted with twi;t 1 in
columns [2] and [3]; * signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, ****
35Figure 1: Weighted averages of conversion rates and rms' TFP growth rates (ESEE, 1992-2005).
Figure 2: Weighted averages of conversion rates and rms' TFP growth rates (ESEE, 1992-2005).
36Figure 3: C.d.fs of conversion rates and rms' TFP by size and age. Firms' TFP measured
using the TFP index, ~ a, estimated by Levisohn and Petrin's (2003) approach; conversion rates
are obtained from ESEE.
37Figure 4: Conversion rates before and after 1994, 1997 and 2002 EPL reforms.
Figure 5: Conversion rates before and after 1999 when there was no reform.
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